Investment Funds and Debt-Equity Swaps: Broadening the Base of a New Financial Tool by Wallenstein, Stephen M. & Silkenat, James R.
Fordham International Law Journal
Volume 12, Issue 1 1988 Article 2
Investment Funds and Debt-Equity Swaps:
Broadening the Base of a New Financial Tool
Stephen M. Wallenstein∗ James R. Silkenat†
∗
†
Copyright c©1988 by the authors. Fordham International Law Journal is produced by The Berke-
ley Electronic Press (bepress). http://ir.lawnet.fordham.edu/ilj
Investment Funds and Debt-Equity Swaps:
Broadening the Base of a New Financial Tool
Stephen M. Wallenstein and James R. Silkenat
Abstract
This article first examines the emergence of several new market-oriented mechanisms that
could help relieve both the ominous “debt overhang” confronting many developing countries and
equally ominous financial exposure of commercial banks. Prominent among these mechanisms are
debt-equity swaps (or debt-for-equity conversions), which are examined in this article with a view
of assessing their potential impact on the economic outlook for a number of developing countries.
Particular emphasis will be placed in this article on the recent establishment of investment funds
with debt-equity conversion framework and on the differences between these funds and the more
traditional country-fund approach that has been developed in countries like Korea and Thailand.
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INTRODUCTION
In the face of an aggregate external debt of some US$1.3
trillion,' developing countries are confronted by draconian ob-
stacles to economic development against which the develop-
ment dilemmas of previous years pale in comparison. As the
data in Table 1 suggest, in the 1980s the external debt of de-
veloping countries as a whole has increased dramatically, not
only in absolute terms, but also as a percentage of Gross Na-
tional Product ("GNP") and as a percentage of exports. The
level of debt-service payments for these countries has risen
commensurately. As a result, debtor countries have found it
increasingly difficult-in both economic and political terms-
to honor interest and principal commitments on existing
loans, 2 while meeting national development program objec-
tives and fulfilling obligations to multilateral lending agencies.
The situation has been exacerbated by a significant reduction
in new lending to debtor countries by commercial banks.3
* Senior Counsel, International Finance Corporation ("IFC") of the World
Bank group, Washington, D.C. B.A. 1969, Cornell University; M.A. 1970, Harvard
Univerity; J.D. 1974, Yale University. The views expressed in this article do not nec-
essarily reflect the opinions and positions of IFC or the World Bank.
** Partner, Morrison & Foerster, New York, New York and Chairman-Elect
of the ABA's Section of International Law and Practice. B.A. 1969, Drury College;
J.D. 1972, University of Chicago; LL.M. (International Law) 1978, New York Univer-
sity.
1. WORLD BANK, WORLD DEBT TABLES (1988-89 ed.); see Sloan, The Third World
Debt Crisis: Where We Have Been and Where We Are Going, WASH. Q, Winter 1988, at
103, 106-07.
2. See Review of the International Lending Supervision Act of 1983: Hearing Before the
Subcomm. on International Finance and Monetary Policy of the Senate Comm. on Banking,
Housing, and Urban Affairs, 99th Cong., 2d Sess. 42 (1986) (statement of Karin Lis-
sakers, Adjunct Professor of International Affairs, Columbia University). Lissakers
has noted that "Latin American debtors have paid out more than $130 billion in
interest since the [debt] crisis began, only to find themselves $50 billion deeper in
debt." Id. at 44.
3. See L. Clarke, Promoting Country Funds and Foreign Portfolio Investments
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Latin American countries owe a significant percentage-
approximately one-third-of the total external debt of devel-
oping countries. As the information in Table 2 indicates, Ar-
gentina, Mexico, Brazil, and Chile together had debt levels
close to US$300 billion at the end of 1987, approximately one-
fourth of all developing-country external debt for that year.
The acute difficulties implicit in these levels of debt, re-
sulting as they have in repeated attempts at some resolution of
the debt issue (such as cyclical efforts to reschedule and
restructure existing debt), have demonstrated the necessity of
fashioning a more effective approach to the world debt crisis
and the threat it poses to the international economic system.
Though such an international approach has not yet material-
ized, the formalization of the international debt crisis in Au-
gust 1982' -has initiated consideration of a wide range of possi-
ble alternative economic and financial responses.5
Against this background, several new market-oriented
mechanisms have emerged that could help relieve both the
ominous "debt overhang" confronting many developing coun-
tries and the equally ominous financial exposure of commercial
banks. Prominent among these mechanisms are debt-equity
swaps (or debt-for-equity conversions), which are examined
here with a view to assessing their potential impact on the eco-
nomic outlook for a number of developing countries. Particu-
lar emphasis will be placed in this article on the recent estab-
lishment of investment funds within the debt-equity conver-
Through Debt Conversions: The IFC Experience 2 (address presented before the
Seminar on Debt/Equity Swaps sponsored by the United Nations Center on Transna-
tional Corporations and the Latin American Economic System, in Caracas, Vene-
zuela, Apr. 27-29, 1988) (available at the Fordham International Law Journal office).
The participation of commercial banks in loans to developing countries has shifted
from a high of some forty percent in 1981 to a present level of less than five percent.
Id.
4. The announcement by Mexico, in August 1982, that it would withhold pay-
ment on its foreign debt and that some US$4 billion would be needed to satisfy its
creditors, coupled with the announcement by Brazil in the same year that it would
default on debt repayments, can be taken to mark the beginning of what has come to
be called the international debt crisis.
5. See, e.g., Rotberg, Toward a Solution to the Debt Crisis, INT'L ECON., May/June
1988, at 42; Robinson, Seek New Alternatives on Debt, J. Com., May 5, 1988, at 6A, col.
2; Yemma, A Reader's Guide to Third-World Debt-Forgiveness Plans, Christian Sci. Monitor,
Mar. 11, 1988, at 13, col. 1; Broad & Cavanagh, How to Approach Third World Debt, N.Y.
Times, Mar. 3, 1988, at A31, col. 1.
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sion framework and on the differences between these funds
and the more traditional country-fund approach that has been
developed in countries like Korea and Thailand.
One of the reasons for the resort to new mechanisms like
debt-equity swaps and investment funds (in addition to other
devices like "exit bonds," "retiming," and "early-bird spe-
cials") 6 has been the simple inability of creditors, debtors, and
multilateral financial institutions to agree on any broad-gauge
solution or solutions. Whether such schemes amount to more
than "band-aids" for the ongoing problem is still an open
question-one that is only partially resolved by examining the
intricacies and interrelationships of debt-equity swaps and in-
vestment funds.
Debt conversion activities can be divided into several
broad categories. The most prevalent activity is straight swap-
ping of acquired debt for equity investments in local enter-
prises, for other sovereign debt, or for local currency. A sub-
set of this kind of activity utilizes pooled investment vehicles,
or investment funds, in which a consortia of resident and non-
resident banks with the same general objectives pool a portion
of their loans to form a "national investment trust." Another
strategy involves swapping debt for goods (exports). Certain
of these mechanisms, with a specific focus on country fund ve-
hicles, are examined here in terms of legal considerations in
the United States and in selected Latin American countries.
I. INVESTMENT FUNDS FOR DEBT-EQUITY
CONVERSIONS: AN OVERVIEW
A. General Nature
The recent emergence of secondary markets for the trade
of debt instruments in certain developing countries represents
an important means by which more manageable levels of de-
veloping-country debt can be obtained. Though the level of
6. In a debt reduction plan involving "exit bonds," banks agree to accept low-
interest government guaranteed bonds in exchange for a portion of their existing
debt. "Retiming" generally refers to a plan in which banks agree to accept interest
once yearly instead of semi-annually, thus reducing the difficulties inherent in man-
aging a debtor country's foreign exchange requirements. The term "early bird spe-
cial" refers to a plan in which banks that agree early to new loans to a debtor country
receive extra fees on their commitment.
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trading in these new debt instruments constitutes only a small
percentage-at present, less than one percentTof the total
external debt accumulated by developing countries, the rate of
growth in such markets suggests that the debt-equity approach
to confronting the world debt crisis is likely to become increas-
ingly significant.
The concept of "conversion" of debt to equity is a well
established financial method of revitalizing bankrupt corpora-
tions in the United States' and elsewhere. Likewise, transac-
tions involving the sale of debt from one bank to another (oc-
casionally in bulk) are a well established means of managing
portfolios. The application of these procedures to highly-in-
debted developing countries, however, is much more recent.
Within this framework, external debt instruments are con-
verted into local currency or local central bank obligations.
Such debt is traded in a secondary market managed by com-
mercial and investment banks based outside the developing
countries. This allows the debt to be acquired by banks or
other putative investors. The discounts currently available in
these secondary markets for selected Latin American countries
are set out in Table 3.
For debtor countries, conversions represent, first, a means
by which a percentage of overall debt can be retired without
the use of limited foreign exchange and, second, a channel
through which new investment can be promoted. Chile, which
has developed one of the most sophisticated debt-equity mech-
anisms, has retired from 1985 to the end of 1987 approxi-
mately US$4 billion of its approximately US$20 billion in for-
eign debt by utilizing this approach 9 (see Table 4). The invest-
ment provided by debt conversions also presents the potential
of an improved outlook for economic growth, higher levels of
employment, increased tax revenues, gains in export revenues,
and a host of other related fiscal benefits. In addition, debt-
equity transactions permit local governments to promote de-
velopment in geographically- and/or sector-specific areas. For
example, Brazil's longstanding tax incentive program, which
7. WORLD BANK, WORLD DEVELOPMENT REPORT 22 (1987).
8. The most prominent recent example of a case of this type involving U.S. gov-
ernment participation was the reorganization of the Chrysler Corporation.
9. See Christian, Chile's Debt-Swap Plan Cuts Loan by $4 Billion, N.Y. Times, July 18,
1988, at D10, col. 5.
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TABLE 3: Recent Price Quotes for Debt of Selected
Latin American Countries
(U.S. cents on the dollar)
Country May 1988 12-Month
Bid Ask High Low
Argentina
Bolivia
Brazil
Chile
Mexico
Nicaragua
Peru
Venezuela
28.0
10.5
55.0
61.0
53.5
2.0
4.055.0
29.0
12.0
56.0
62.0
54.5
4.0
9.0
56.0
60.5
12.0
65.5
72.5
59.5
6.0
15.0
74.0
25.0
6.0
38.0
50.0
46.5
2.0
4.0
49.5
Source: Anders & Truell, For Investors Who Are Strong of Heart, Third- World
Debt Holds Some Allure, Wall St.J., May 17, 1988, at 41, col. 4 (quoting Bear,
Stearns & Co. figures).
TABLE 4: The Effect of Debt-Equity Conversions on Chilean Debt,
1985-January 1987
(U.S. $ millions)
Debtor 1985 1986 Jan. 1987 Total
Medium and long-term debt 37.0 966.7 249.4 1,587.0
Central Bank 36.9 122.1 140.0 299.0
State Bank 5.7 29.2 8.0 42.9
Public enterprises 9.3 116.4 - 125.7
Private sector with public guarantee
(restructuring 1983-1984) 35.6 150.4 30.8 216.8
Private financial sector 126.7 320.0 55.2 504.3
Private company sector 157.2 228.6 13.0 398.8
Short-term debt
(private financial sector) - 1.8 - 1.8
Total Reduction 371.4 968.5 249.4 1,589.0
Source: Rubin, Chile, in GUIDE TO DEBT EQUITY SWAPS 180 (S. Rubin ed.
1987) (quoting Central Bank of Chile figures).
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seeks to augment investment in the northeast region of the
country, has been incorporated into Brazil's new debt-equity
review and approval authority.10
Investments in the northeast of Brazil and in other incen-
tive areas of the country are carried out in an auction process
separate from investments in the rest of the country. Gener-
ally, auction discounts in the incentive area are less than dis-
counts that apply in the free area, resulting, in local terms, in
larger foreign capital registration and investment in the incen-
tive area for an equal amount of eligible debt converted."'
From the standpoint of debtor countries, however, there
are a number of possible macroeconomic drawbacks to debt-
equity conversions. Clearly, the potential exists that the addi-
tional local currency necessary to meet debt-equity transac-
tions could lead to monetary growth and inflationary pressures
above and beyond the current high levels in Latin America.' 2
Apart from the more general and obvious negative effects on
the economy, an increase in inflation could run contrary to the
rigid monetary supply criteria established by the International
Monetary Fund (the "IMF") and other multilateral lending
10. For a discussion of Brazil's recently revitalized debt-equity conversion pro-
gram, see Truell, Debt Swaps by Brazilians Draw Interest, but Terms Discourage Some Partici-
pants, Wall St. J., Apr. 26, 1988, at 34, col. 2.
11. Table of Discounts for Brazilian Auction*
1988 Free Area Incentive Area
March 27.0% 10.5%
April 32.0% 15.0%
May 22.0% 0.5%
June 13.5% 16.0%**
July 27.0% 11.0%
August 29.5% 8.0%
September 34.5% 6.0%
October 38.0% 16.5%
November 50.0% 21.5%
December 49.0% 18.0%
* US$150 million in debt is offered each month: US$75 million for the free area
and US$75 million for the incentive area.
** One bidder bid for US$50 million of the US$75 million offered in the auction.
Information courtesy of Marine Midland Bank, International Department, New York
City.
12. For a discussion of the negative factors that may accompany a debt-equity
conversion program, see Roberts & Remolona, Debt Swaps: A Technique in Developing
Country Finance, in GUIDE TO DEBT EQurry SWAPS 41 (S. Rubin ed. 1987) [hereinafter
GUIDE]; Riding, Deepening Gloom Over Latin Debt, N.Y. Times, Dec. 28, 1987, at D8, col.
4.
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agencies in support of balance-of-payments and other
macroeconomic development objectives.) " It is important to
note, however, in the final analysis, that monetary pressures
generated by debt-equity conversions may not differ from the
effects of increased foreign direct investment.
The larger Latin American debtor countries have re-
sponded to the debt problem with significantly different con-
version systems. Brazil has limited the volume of transactions
primarily to a monthly auction of the equivalent of US$150
million in an effort both to gauge the effects of the conversions
on the monetary supply and to build a more rationalized na-
tional mechanism for the regulation of the conversion process.
By contrast, Chile has enacted a system in which the Central
Bank issues government bonds instead of pesos, which are
traded in the local securities market.' 4 The bonds are then
traded at a discount because they pay a rate of interest that is
slightly less than the "UFR rate."' 5 From the standpoint of
monetary pressures, money is not created immediately
through this system because "new money" is not injected into
the economy. The money does, however, go to private invest-
ment instead of to the government. There is also the inverse
concern in certain Latin American debtor countries (and
among some Western critics of the conversion process as well)
that debt-equity conversions do not inject "fresh money" into
the economies, but merely subsidize investment that would
have been made in the absence of the debt-equity mecha-
nism.1 6 Such concern has been particularly apparent in Argen-
13. See M. Rodriguez, Debt Equity Swaps: The Latin American Experience (ad-
dress presented before the Conference on Debt-Equity Conversions in Latin
America, in Caracas, Venezuela, May 1988) (available at the Fordham International Law
Journal office). Rodriguez, an influential debt commentator, has noted that "[slince
the inception of Chile's program in June 1985, Chile's inflation rate has fallen from
33% to 20% even though the volume of swaps each month is equivalent to 10% of its
monetary base." Id. at 21. He also observed that the effect of debt-equity conver-
sions on inflation varies from country to country, and drew attention to the inflation-
ary pressures experienced by Mexico. Id.
14. BANCO CENTRAL DE CHILE, COMPENDIUM OF RULES ON INTERNATIONAL Ex-
CHANGE, chs. XVIII-XIX (May 1985) [hereinafter chs. XVIII-XIX]; see infra text ac-
companying notes 38-39.
15. The "UFR rate" (Unidad de Fomento Rato) represents the blended rate of
Chilean treasury bonds of different rates.
16. See Bentley, Debt Conversion in Latin America, COLUM. J. WORLD Bus., Fall
1986, at 37, 38-40.
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tina, where laws governing the debt-equity conversion process
require investors to make additional local investments in con-
nection with their debt-equity transactions. 17
For their part, creditors-primarily commercial banks-
engage in debt-equity transactions for several reasons. Be-
cause the banks, by trading debt, receive a relatively high per-
centage of their loan repayments in local currency, they are
able to replace sovereign debt with high-risk equity assets, in-
stead of selling loans at a more substantial discount in dollar
terms. To the extent that countries are behind on interest pay-
ments, banks can convert their loans to an investment that of-
fers a potentially greater rate of return through dividends and
capital gains.18 Moreover, banks can either diversify their ex-
posure to a number of countries or concentrate their creditor
position in a single debtor country to maximize a comparative
advantage, reduce administrative expenses, or implement a
longer-range strategy in the local country. Through debt-eq-
uity conversions, such banks can then invest in local enter-
prises by means of direct debt-equity swapping by local debt-
equity teams, established typically by larger banks for the pur-
pose of identifying suitable longer-term local investment op-
portunities, or under a "pooled" venture-capital structure-
either off-shore mutual funds or venture-capital fund struc-
tures.' 9
Certain large commercial banks in the United States were
initially reluctant to sell their loans at a discount because of the
losses they would be required to show on their respective bal-
ance sheets. Another obstacle to their participation in debt-
equity conversions had to do with the American Institute of
Certified Public Accountants (the "AICPA") accounting rules.
While the banks have been able to maintain the debt on their
books at full value (while taking substantial reserves of about
thirty percent against their-developing-country debt portfolio),
the AICPA has held that an equity investment acquired
through debt-equity conversions should be reflected at its fair-
market value-or at a loss on the full value of the loan. 20 De-
17. See infra text accompanying notes 28-30.
18. Sloan, supra note 1, at 114.
19. See infra text accompanying notes 54-74.
20. See Notice to Practitioners on Accounting for Foreign Loan Swaps, CPA Letter, May
1988]
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spite these obstacles, certain major banking institutions have
elected recently to set aside certain parts of their third-world
loan portfolio for debt-equity swaps. They have done so be-
cause of their continuing loan exposure and because of the de-
velopment of new and more effective debt-equity frameworks
in certain developing debtor countries. Larger money-center
banks with specialized staffs are able to carry out debt-equity
conversion programs themselves. Two notable examples are
the US$3 billion internal fund recently set aside by Citibank
for debt-conversions and the US$1.6 billion internal fund es-
tablished by Chase Manhattan Bank."'
In the final analysis, however, debt-equity transactions
represent additional risk to creditors, because the exchange of
debt paper for equity investments is subject to a range of addi-
tional uncertainties. Investments are linked implicitly with fu-
ture economic trends and shifts in economic policy as well as
with the vagaries of politics and social philosophy in the coun-
tries involved. In addition, equity investments are unsecured,
there is no agreed return on investment (such as interest), they
are subject to the control of majority shareholders, they re-
quire supervision and monitoring, and they are ultimately
much more time-intensive than is debt management. Likewise,
the limited number of investment opportunities in most devel-
oping countries brings into question the extent to which the
local economies can provide favorable outlets for large debt-
equity conversion schemes. Debt-equity conversion programs
are currently in place or are under serious consideration in
Mexico, Brazil, Chile, Argentina, Uruguay, Jamaica, Costa
Rica, the Philippines, Nigeria, Peru, Colombia, and Ecuador.22
27, 1985, at 3. The practice is based on the procedures employed in the accounting
for debt-for-debt transactions. Id.
21. Chase Manhattan Bank has already taken steps to convert US$200 million of
its Brazilian debt into shares in Autolatina. Chase did not have to surrender its debt
at a discount in this transaction, because the conversion took place under Brazilian
regulations that preceded debt auctions that began in Brazil in March 1988. See Bar-
ham, Chase Converts Brazilian Debt, Fin. Times, June 2, 1988, at 23, col. 5. This saved
Chase a considerable sum inasmuch as the discount in recent auctions has ranged
from 13.5% to 50%. See supra note 11.
22. For a brief summary of the debt capitalization programs existing in a
number of these countries, see Capitalisation Programmes: A Survey, INT'L FIN. L. REV.,
Jan. 1988, at 38.
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1. Volume
Both the expansion of secondary debt markets and the de-
velopment of relevant national regulations and procedures
governing trade have resulted in a steadily increasing volume
of debt-related transactions. In 1984, total secondary market
transactions in developing-nation debt instruments amounted
to some US$1 billion. The corresponding levels for 1985 and
1986-US$3 billion and US$6 billion, respectively 2 3-reveal
increases that may continue as the mechanics of the markets
become more highly refined.
Despite the number of countries involved in debt-equity
conversion programs, the volume of debt-equity conversions is
constrained by considerations pertaining to the economic cir-
cumstances of debtor Countries and creditor institutions alike.
As previously mentioned, the potential inflationary effects of
large debt-equity transactions have compelled indebted coun-
tries to regulate carefully the amount of their debt sold in sec-
ondary markets. Moreover, the opportunity cost to creditors
of liquidating a large percentage of their debt paper may in-
clude unacceptable financial and political costs. Together,
these elements could serve to reduce somewhat the rate of
growth of debt-equity transactions that has been prevalent in
recent years.
2. Structures
Debt-equity conversions are the outgrowth, at the interna-
tional level, of longstanding financial practices in the United
States and elsewhere regarding failing or bankrupt enterprises.
In the aftermath of the 1982 international debt crisis, commer-
cial banks became more active in trading their sovereign debt
paper for other national debt in order to diversify their debt
portfolios or, conversely, to concentrate their holdings in one
or more specific countries. Apart from reasons pertaining to
strategic planning and portfolio management, tax considera-
tions may also be a factor in the exchange of sovereign debt.24
23. WORLD DEVELOPMENT REPORT, supra note 7, at 22; see Weinert, Swapping
Third World Debt, FOREIGN POL'Y, Winter 1986-87, at 85, 86.
24. The biggest problem has been the imposition of significant local withhold-
ing taxes on dividends and capital gains to be remitted from the developing coun-
tries.
1988]
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In addition, local commercial banks in the debtor countries
themselves have been among the creditors involved in debt-
for-debt swaps, primarily for the purpose of acquiring their
own debt at a discount.
In light of the ominous outlook for global debt trends, the
absence of a more direct international approach to the debt
crisis, and the acute economic obstacles facing many highly in-
debted countries, the evolution from debt-for-debt swaps to
debt-for-equity conversions may be viewed as more of a neces-
sity than a choice. As with debt-for-debt swaps, debt-for-eq-
uity conversions draw from traditional financial procedures in
which debt is traded for equity stakes in one or more enter-
prises. In the case of international debt-equity transactions,
however, such procedures are subject to the uncertainties at-
tendant upon the evolving political, legal, and economic
frameworks existing in debtor developing states.
Latin American countries were the first of the highly-in-
debted states to implement debt-equity conversions. Brazil
and Argentina enacted debt-equity programs in the early
1980s, but due to concerns over possible monetary pressures,
competition with foreign direct investment that would occur
without debt-equity schemes, and the conversion of local cur-
rency to dollars on the black market, these early programs
were curtailed until they were reimplemented recently with
regulatory changes.2 5 Chile initiated its system in 1985, when
chapters XVIII and XIX were added to the Chilean Central
Bank's exchange regulations. 26 Mexico's debt-equity conver-
sion program began in 1986.27
Typically, the structure of debt-equity conversions is
straightforward in theory and more complex in practice. A for-
eign investor-generally a foreign company, often acting
through a foreign bank-buys discounted local currency in ex-
change for sovereign debt notes in a secondary market over-
seen by the central economic authority. Such purchases are
often conducted through an auction process in which the terms
and volume of transactions are regulated by the local govern-
25. See infra text accompanying notes 28-37.
26. See supra note 14.
27. Newman, Trends in the Market for Developing Country Debt and Debt Equity Conver-
sions, in GUIDE, supra note 12, at 10, 12.
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ment. The local currency, under conditions, restrictions, and
inducements imposed by the respective legal systems, is then
used to purchase equity investments in local corporations. In
order to foreclose the risk of short-term capital repatriation.by
the investor, the term of the equity investments generally is
mandated to be at least as long as the duration of the original
sovereign debt arrangements. Variations on this general
theme are numerous.
Participants in debt-equity conversions are not confined to
commercial banks holding sovereign debt paper. Debtor
countries themselves may elect to purchase their own debt at a
discount. Nationals may also purchase debt in an effort to ex-
pand investments or to capitalize an ongoing ,local enterprise.
Participants also include multinational corporations seeking to
secure an investment position or to expand or increase the
capitalization of an existing subsidiary.
B. Country-by-Country Differences
Particular attention will be focused in this article on the
legal mechanisms governing the emerging debt-equity struc-
tures of three of the principal highly-indebted Latin American
countries, namely Argentina, Brazil, and Chile. This back-
ground is important in understanding and evaluating the po-
tential for investment funds in these and other countries.
1. Argentina
The establishment, in 1984, of a debt-equity conversion
system in Argentina was short-lived due primarily to objections
arising from "round-tripping, ' 28 declining foreign direct in-
vestment, and potentially negative monetary effects. The
reconfigured debt-equity conversion structure that emerged in
April 1987, during negotiations with creditorsinstitutions, took
these three factors into account by reducing the potential for
round-tripping, by restricting the size of the program to
US$1.9 billion over a five-year period, and by mandating a ra-
28. "Round-tripping" refers to the practice of bringing back into a particular
country funds that had been effectively transferred abroad as.a result of under-invoic-
ing by exporters or over-invoicing by importers. This reintroduction of capital would
be done at the more favorable exchange rate usually offered through the debt-con-
version process.
1988]
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tio of thirty to seventy of matching investment, which can be in
local currency, to the amount of the converted loan. 29 The sys-
tem differs from its Brazilian and Chilean counterparts in its
modest size, which is clearly intended to deflect potential infla-
tionary effects. It also departs from other systems, particularly
the experience in Chile, in the extent to which the government
assumes a controlling role in the transactions.30
Under the Argentine plan, the Ministry of Economy ac-
cepts bids to convert debt held by banks or companies wishing
to invest in Argentina. Such companies purchase the debt pa-
per from Argentina's commercial creditors at a substantial dis-
count. Thus, a company wishing to purchase US$1 million in
Argentine debt would pay a commercial bank US$200,000, re-
flecting the value of Argentine debt in the secondary market.
The company, however, can only acquire local currency at a
discount from its official value and must offer the Ministry of
Economy such discount as part of the debt-equity swap. The
discount offer is included in the company's bid. The Ministry
of Economy has set a twenty-five-percent discount as the mini-
mum it will accept. Discounts at the end of 1988, however,
reached seventy percent. Thus, the most our hypothetical
company would have received at the time would have been
US$300,000 in Argentine currency. Although the Argentine
discount seems steep, the scheme remains attractive to foreign
investors, because the conversion occurs at the parallel ex-
change rate, rather than the official commercial rate. Essen-
tially, the result is that investors get US$300,000 in local cur-
rency for the US$200,000 spent to acquire the debt.
The goal of the Argentine plan is two-fold. Argentina
hopes to reduce its debt by US$1.9 billion over the next four
years. As scheduled, the program was intended to cover debts
worth US$300 million by July 1, 1988 (although the target has
29. See EL DERECiO-LEGSLACI6N ARGENTINA [E.D.L.A.] No. 21.382 (subse-
quently amended by E.D.L.A. No. 22.208); BANCO CENTRAL. DE LA REPOBLICA ARGEN-
TINA, Comunicaci6n "A" 1035 (June 1, 1987); E.D.L.A. Resoluci6n 520 (Ministerio
de Economia May 29, 1987); COMUNICADO CONJUNTO DEL MINISTERIO DE ECONOMfA V
EL BANCO CENTRAL DE LA REPOBLICA ARGENTINA No. 7691.
30. For a discussion of Argentina's debt-equity conversion program, see Cirde-
nas, Argentina's New Debt to Equity Conversion Programme, INT'L FIN. L. REv., Aug. 1987,
at 32; Onetto, Argentina: Debt Capitalisation and Matching Funds, Irr'L FIN. L. REV., Dec.
1987, at 47; TruelU, Citicorp Plans Debt-for-Equity Swap with Argentina; Restructuring
Signed, Wall St. J., Aug. 24, 1987, at 20, col. 2.
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not been reached) and US$400 million in each of the next four
years. Argentina is also using the debt-equity plan as a way of
promoting foreign investment. Under the terms of the pro-
gram, investors can cover up to seventy percent of project
costs with funds raised by debt-equity swaps; the remaining
thirty percent must be supplied in the form of new funds.
2. Brazil
As the data in Table 2 suggest, at the end of 1987 the total
Brazilian external debt approached US$117 billion and contin-
ues to represent a formidable obstacle to economic develop-
ment.' Brazil, as stated previously, was the first country to
enact a debt-equity conversion program as a means of con-
fronting its high levels of sovereign debt. In 1982, the Central
Bank offered, under Executive Act No. 199432 and subsequent
amendments, a ten-percent discount on debt-equity conver-
sions. The program was curtailed, however, in November
1984, when the Central Bank sought to limit round-tripping,
illegal repatriation of capital by foreign corporations, and re-
ductions in foreign direct investment by adopting Carta Circu-
lar No. 1125. 33 As a result of this regulation, the volume of
conversions dropped from US$581 million in 1985 to US$191
million in 1986. 34
The Brazilian debt-equity conversion system was only re-
cently revived when the Central Bank opted, onJuly 20, 1987,
to consider swaps on a case-by-case basis. A new legal frame-
work for conversions, Resolution No. 1416, was introduced by
31. In 1986, when the total Brazilian external debt exceeded US$110 billion,
Brazilian debt of US$6.4 billion, falling due in 1985, was rolled-over by commercial
banks to March 1987. The Paris Club rescheduled another US$4.1 billion in January
1987. In February 1987, Brazil also announced a moratorium on debt payments,
precipitating the severance or restriction of lines of credit by many international
creditors. Payment of some debt obligations has resumed. Negotiations are cur-
rently underway between commercial banks and Brazil for new loans in the amount
of US$5.2 billion. Rubin, Brazil, in GUIDE, supra note 12, at 192; see Blustein, Brazil's
High-Stakes Debt Talks: Throwing Good Money After Bad?, Wash. Post, May 24, 1988, at
Cl, col. 3.
32. DIARIO OFICIAL [D.O.], Ato Executivo No. 1.994 (Braz. Dec. 29, 1982).
33. D.O., Carta Circular No. 1.125 (Braz. Nov. 9, 1984).
34. Rubin, Brazil, in GUIDE, supra note 12, at 193 (quoting Central Bank figures);
see Debt/Equity Swaps Finally Come of Age, Gazeta Mercantil, Apr. 15, 1988, at 1, col. 2
(int'l weekly ed.).
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the Central Bank in November 1987.35 This resolution, which
required participants in debt-equity transactions to accede to
subsequent modifications in restructuring agreements, met
with opposition from the international financial community
and was amended as Resolution No. 1460 on February 1,
1988, to exclude the previous modification requirement. 6
Pursuant to the current resolution, sovereign debt is auctioned
at a ceiling amount and the discount percentage is determined
by the auction process. Foreign debt-equity investors invest-
ing in stock market funds are prohibited from owning more
than five percent of the voting capital or twenty percent of the
total capital of any one company. Finally, funds invested in
Brazil must remain in the country for a period of twelve
years. 7
3. Chile
The debt-equity system in Chile, which was inaugurated in
May 1985 with the adoption by the Central Bank of two addi-
tional chapters-chapters XVIII and XIX--to its regulations
governing foreign exchange, is regarded as the most effective
of its kind. The program is based on flexibility and emphasizes
the role of the private sector in the conduct of debt-equity
transactions. It has resulted in the greatest levels of conver-
sion of any debtor state. This more laissez-faire position of the
Chilean government has also led to a greater level of participa-
tion in the process by Chilean nationals with capital abroad as
well as the involvement Of creditor institutions.38
Chapter XVIII of the Chilean regulations, directed at ef-
fecting repatriation of flight capital of Chilean nationals, pro-
vides for the purchase of foreign currency-denominated debt
paper from the range of public and private debtors in the
country. The investor submits a bid to the Central Bank,
which, through a monthly auction process, makes a predeter-
35. BANCO CENTRAL DO BRASIL, Resolu§5o No. 1.416 (Nov. 17, 1987).
36. BANCO CENTRAL DO BRASIL, Resou 5o No. 1.460 (Feb. 1, 1988).
37. For a discussion of Brazil's debt-equity conversion program, see Ashford,
Brazil Plans for State Auctions, EUROMONEY, Sept. 1987, at 93; Werrett, Debt-Equity Deal
That Cut Through Brazilian Jungle, CORP. FIN., Sept. 1987, at 89.
38. For a discussion of Chile's debt-equity conversion program, see Marcy, Chile
May Use Copper to Collateralize Debt, J. Com., May 11, 1988, at 13A, col. 5; Truell, Chile
Pushes Debt-Conversion Program, Wall St. J., Dec. 9, 1987, at 34, col. 1.
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mined amount of debt available for sale. The converted funds
are then invested in Chilean enterprises. Conversely, another
provision in Chilean law, chapter XIX of the Central Bank reg-
ulations,39 which is directed at foreign creditor institutions and
other foreign investors, allows for debt conversions through
the same auction process. Investors in both instances are re-
quired to maintain capital in Chile for a period of ten years and
dividends for a period of four years.
C. Development of an After-Market
The secondary market in developing-country debt is ex-
pected to-reach almost US$30 billion in 1988. There are ap-
proximately fifty commercial and investment banks with de-
partments designed to deal in debt-equity conversions and
debt swaps, although about eight of these institutions account
for more than eighty-five percent of the volume.40
Several issues-although relatively few answers-arise
with regard to this secondary market. First, there is the ques-
tion of whether secondary market prices should be used as a
measure of the extent to which banks should write down their
existing debts. Second, there is the question of the thinness of
the market, combined with the width of bid/offer spreads and
the perceived unresponsiveness of the market to external
events. t
D. Morgan/Mexico Program
Among the more intriguing debt-swap proposals of recent
years was the debt-swap plan for Mexico initiated in early 1988
39. The regulations contained in ch. XIX represent an amendment of the basic
laws governing debt-equity conversions contained in the Chilean Foreign Investment
Statute, Decree Law No. 600 of 1974 (ESTATUTO DE LA INVERsI6N EXTRANJERA,
Decreto Ley No. 600, de 1974) [hereinafter Decree Law No. 600]. The main differ-
ence between the two sets of regulations is the extension of the period of repatriation
of initial investment and dividends. Compare Decree Law No. 600, tit. II, art. 4, with
ch. XIX, supra note 14, at § 6(b).
40. See M. Schubert, A Critical Appraisal of the Changing Secondary Market for
Discounted Third World Debt 4 (address presented before the Debt-Equity/Swap
Market Conference sponsored by the Institute for International Research, in New
York City, Oct. 19-20, 1987) (available at the Fordham International Law Journal office).
41. For a rigorous economic analysis of the shape and scope of the secondary
market, see Laney, The Secondary Market in Developing Country Debt: Some Observations
and Policy Implications, ECON. REV., July 1987, at 1.
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by the Morgan Guaranty Trust Company of New York. Essen-
tially, the plan amounted to giving commercial banks an op-
portunity to swap a portion of their Mexican loans at a dis-
count, for new marketable Mexican bonds, backed by U.S.
Treasury bonds.
Under the plan, the principal on the Mexican bonds that
the banks received in exchange for their pre-existing debt was
backed by twenty-year, zero-coupon U.S. Treasury bonds,
which would be purchased separately by the Mexican govern-
ment for purposes of this plan and placed in a special escrow
arrangement with the Federal Reserve Bank of New York.
This portion of the plan was intended to offer banks greater
assurance concerning eventual payment of the principal of the
bonds. A problem of the program, however, was that while the
principal was guaranteed, the interest was not.
While the potential advantages of the plan, both to the
commercial banks and to Mexico, were significant, the actual
result for Mexico was less meaningful than had been hoped.
Rather than the US$10 billion external debt reduction for
Mexico that was anticipated, the actual reduction resulting
from the swap was only slightly in excess of US$1 billion.42
The Morgan/Mexico plan attracted 320 bids from 139
commercial banks covering US$6.7 billion of debt. Mexico ac-
cepted bids from 95 of those banks covering US$3.67 billion of
its US$53 billion of debt to foreign banks, which was replaced
by US$2.6 billion in bonds. Mexico accepted tenders from
banks up to a price of 74.99 cents on the dollar. The average
price that Mexico paid for the debt that it accepted was less
than 70 cents on the dollar.43
Although the Morgan/Mexico plan did not produce the
volume that was envisioned, it is nonetheless likely to result in
additional attempts at related forms of debt reduction. An ex-
ample of this would be the recently announced efforts by the
Mexican Finance Ministry to expand on the Morgan Guaranty
plan.44 One proposed modification of the Morgan plan would
improve the security on the bonds by having the government
42. Truell, Mexico's Plan to Reduce Debt is Short of Goal, Wall St.J., Mar. 4, 1988, at
3, col. 4.
43. Id.
44. See Mexican Debt: Any Interest, THE ECONOMIST, June 18, 1988, at 78.
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offer to deposit one year's interest in an escrow account. This
amount would be forfeited if Mexico defaulted on the interest
payments on the bonds. If Mexico did pay, the escrow account
interest would roll over and guarantee the next year's inter-
est.45 The lack of security for interest payments under the
original Morgan plan was one of its principal weaknesses.
E. Legal Considerations
In the United States, the activities of U.S. banking institu-
tions in debt-equity conversions are governed by three statu-
tory provisions. Section 25 of the Federal Reserve Act46 pro-
vides for U.S. banking organizations to invest in foreign finan-
cial institutions, but requires that other forms of investment in
equity securities (except for investments directly in financial in-
stitutions), such as those under the debt-equity conversion
framework, be held indirectly or by bank holding companies.
Additionally, the Federal Reserve Act limits the activities of the
foreign company in which investment is placed by U.S. finan-
cial institutions to geographic areas located outside the United
States, except under circumstances considered to be inciden-
tal.47 Under section 4(c)(13) of the Bank Holding Company
Act, 48 bank holding companies of U.S. financial institutions are
allowed to invest in foreign companies so long as the com-
pany's activities are outside the United States and are consis-
tent with the public interest and the purposes of the Act.49
This traditional framework was altered to some extent by
the amendment, on August 12, 1987, of Regulation K of the
Bank Holding Company Act,50 which is administered by the
U.S. Federal Reserve Board. The amendment of Regulation K
was one of several coinciding structural factors that has lent
significant momentum to the debt-equity conversion process.
Until August 1987, under Federal Reserve Regulation K, a
U.S. banking organization was only allowed to own twenty
percent of the shares of non-financial companies abroad,
although it could own as much as one-hundred percent of for-
45. Id. at 83.
46. 12 U.S.C. §§ 601-604 (1982).
47. 12 U.S.C. § 601.
48. 12 U.S.C. §§ 1841-1850 (1982 & Supp. IV 1986).
49. 12 U.S.C. § 1843(c)(13).
50. 12 C.F.R. pt. 211 (1988).
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eign financial companies. As of August 12, 1987, however, the
Federal Reserve Board liberalized Regulation K so that U.S.
banks could acquire up to one-hundred percent of the shares
of a foreign non-financial company under the following cir-
cumstances: the shares must be acquired from a foreign gov-
ernment (thus promoting privatization) through the conver-
sion of existing sovereign debt obligations; the country in
which the company is located must be a country that has re-
structured its sovereign debt obligations to foreign creditors
since 1980; the ownership interest in the shares being acquired
must be divested as soon as practicable and no later than five
years from the date of acquisition, unless the Federal Reserve
Board extends the time for good cause for up to a total of five
additional years; and the investment must be held through a
bank holding company.5'
51. The operative amendments to § 211.5 of Regulation K are as follows:
(f) Investment made through debt-for-equity conversions-(1) Permissible Investment.
In addition to an investment that may be made under other provisions of
this section, a bank holding company may acquire up to and including 100
percent of the shares of (or other ownership interest in) a foreign'company
if:
(i) The shares are acquired from the government of an eligible coun-
try or from its agencies or instrumentalities;
(ii) The shares are acquired by conversion of sovereign debt obliga-
tions of the eligible country either through a direct exchange of debt obliga-
tions or a payment for the debt in local currency, the proceeds of which are
used to purchase the shares;
(iii) The shares are held by the bank holding company or its subsidiar-
ies, provided however that such shares may not be held by a U.S. insured
bank or its subsidiaries;
(iv) The shares are divested within five years of acquisition unless the
Board extends such time period for good cause shown but no such exten-
sions may in the aggregate exceed five years; and
(v) An investment shall be made under this paragraph in accordance
with the investment procedures of paragraph (c) of this section and shall be
subject to paragraphs (b)(3)(i) (A) and (B) of this section.
(2) Definitions. For the purpose of this paragraph
(i) An "eligible country" means a country that, since 1980, has re-
structured its sovereign debt held by foreign creditors; and
(ii) "Investment" shall have the meaning set forth in § 211.2(i) of this
part and, for purposes of this paragraph, shall include loans or other exten-
sions of credit by the bank holding company or its affiliates to a company
acquired pursuant to this paragraph.
(3) Conditions. (i) Any company acquired pursuant to this paragraph
shall not bear a name similar to the name of the acquiring bank holding
company or any of its affiliates; and
(ii) Neither the bank holding company nor its affiliates shall provide to
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One of the keys to this amendment of Regulation K was
that it fostered privatization in developing countries. Privatiza-
tion 52 is considered by the Federal Reserve to indicate an in-
creased willingness on the part of developing countries to op-
erate business enterprises efficiently and economically and to
be sensitive to market forces.
Although the Federal Reserve's recent amendment of
Regulation K was consistent with privatization policies gener-
ally, there seems to be little economic rationale for limiting the
increased swap participation by U.S. banks only to programs in
developing countries. It would seem equally as important, and
probably even more prudent for U.S. banks, if the new rule
encouraged swaps in developed countries as well.
As now implemented, the revised Regulation K only ap-
plies to debt-equity swaps in countries that have rescheduled
their sovereign debt since 1980. This would include most of
the largest debtor countries that have swap programs-such as
Mexico, Chile, the Philippines, and Brazil-but would exclude
other, more developed, countries where major privatization ef-
forts are well under way.5"
II. COMBINING AN INVESTMENT FUND APPROACH
WITH DEBT-EQUITY SWAPS
A. Overview of Investment Funds
In pooled investment vehicles, or investment funds, a con-
sortia of resident and non-resident banks pool a portion of
their loans to form a "national investment trust." Under this
any company acquired pursuant to this paragraph any confidential business
or other information concerning customers that are engaged in the same or
related lines of business as the company.
12 C.F.R. § 211.5(f) (1988).
The recent amendment to Regulation K is discussed in some detail in Spencer,
Regulation K Allows 100 Per Cent Ownership, Ir'L FIN. L. REV., Oct. 1987, at 13; Berg,
Banks Generally Praise Fed's Third World Shift, N.Y. Times, Aug. 14, 1987, at D2, col. 5.
52. See generally, French, Crash Lessonfor Privatisers, EUROMONEY, Dec. 1987, at 83;
Who's Selling What, and Where?, EUROMONEY, Dec. 1987, at 89; Watson, Privatization
Trend Grows, J. Com., Jan. 2, 1987, at 5A, col. 2.
53. Privatization efforts in developed countries have received considerable at-
tention in the press recently. See, e.g., Burns, Furor Over Air Canada Offering, N.Y.
Times, May 2, 1988, at D8, col. 1; Greenhouse, France Sees Threat to Share Offerings,
N.Y. Times, Nov. 2, 1987, at D8, col. 1; Brinkley, Reagan Appoints Privatization Unit,
N.Y. Times, Sept. 4, 1987, at A28, col. 1; Leung, Privatization Prospects Draw Japanese
Investors to Britain, Asian Wall St. J. Weekly, June 15, 1987, at 25, col. 1.
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arrangement, the consortia could take foreign-currency de-
nominated shares in the trust in exchange for their loans. The
trust's management would then restructure the loans into what
eventually would become a conventional investment trust port-
folio of equities and convertible debt. This trust-or invest-
ment-fund-concept, which is rapidly evolving in a number of
countries, including Brazil, Chile, Mexico, and the Philippines,
presents the potential for facilitating the transformation of sig-
nificant volumes of foreign debt capital into local currency eq-
uity equivalents. 54"
Pooled vehicles are funded either by contributions of sov-
ereign external debt or by a combination of such debt and
fresh infusions of cash. Current holders of a country's debt
would typically exchange their debt for foreign currency-de-
nominated beneficial interests (shares, other units, etc.) in this
intermediary vehicle. Once suitable investment opportunities
in the local economy are identified, the paper is either re-
deemed by the central bank in local currency or exchanged for
central bank notes that are sold in the local market at a dis-
count. The paper is then used to acquire equity investments in
the local economy in the name of the fund.'
The emergence of the investment fund mechanism within
the debt-equity framework draws upon the experience gained
from more traditional portfolio investment vehicles in selected
developing countries and from venture capital funds in devel-
oped countries. While investment funds may appear to be
somewhat similar to smaller U.S.-registered "country funds,"
there are some significant differences.
The modern country-fund concept essentially began with
the Japan Fund more than twenty years ago. The idea was to
make available to investors in the United States and Europe
the shares of companies in a particular foreign market. Rather
than having to invest directly in those shares through a foreign
stock exchange, even where local laws allowed, mutual funds
were formed in the United States and Europe that would re-
54. See, e.g., D. Gill, Internationalizing the Nigerian Securities Market 20-21
(Commemorative Lecture for the Twenty-Fifth Anniversary of the Nigerian Stock Ex-
change, in Lagos, Nigeria, Nov. 19, 1986) (available at the Fordham International Law
Journal office) (stressing pooled investment vehicle approach for Nigeria).
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ceive funds from Western investors and, in turn, invest such
funds in companies in the external market.
Developing countries became the focus of these country
funds with the advent of the Mexico Fund in the early 1980s.
This has been followed by the Korea Fund, the Thai Fund, the
Malaysia Fund (all sponsored in part by International Finance
Corporation ("IFC"), an affiliate of the World Bank),55 and the
Brazil Fund. A more diversified investment strategy is possible
through IFC's Emerging Markets Growth Fund-which fo-
cuses on eight developing countries, including Thailand, Tai-
wan, Malaysia, the Philippines, Jordan, and Argentina-or the
Templeton Emerging Markets Fund, which was listed on the
American Stock Exchange in 1987.56
While the investments by these country funds are of a
portfolio nature, they still meet ideological resistance from a
number of these developing countries. Indeed, in a number of
such countries foreign investment is allowed only through such
funds. Many countries in this category also place strict limits
on repatriation of income, forbid majority ownership by for-
eigners, and maintain high capital gains taxes.
1. Advantages of Investment Funds
The investment-fund mechanism within the debt-equity
framework provides significant advantages to participating
creditors. First, more favorable economies of scale are possi-
ble by virtue of the typically larger size of investments made
available through the funds. Likewise, a diversification of as-
sets offers the possibility of a greater rate of return on invest-
ments at a lower level of risk. Small and regional banks also
benefit from participation in funds managed by larger credit
institutions with the in-house capability to evaluate and man-
age equity investments in developing countries. It has also
been important that emerging capital markets have continued,
on average, to perform in a very strong fashion, even consider-
ing the impact of the October 1987 stock market crash.57
55. For recent commentary on the activities of IFC, see Rowley, The Future Still
Lies With Emerging Markets, FAR E. ECON. REV., Oct. 22, 1987, at 57; Bovard, World
Bank Unit's Lip Seruice to Private Sector, Wall St.J.,June 21, 1988, at 38, col. 3; Pearson,
IFC's Largest Issue Yet Meets Strong Reception, Fin. Times, Mar. 4, 1988, at 22, col. 6.
56. Rowley, supra note 55, at 57.
57. It has recently been reported that there are over thirty-five equity markets in
1q88]
32 FORDHAM INTERNATIONAL LA W JOURNAL [Vol. 12:8
Second, the participation in the funds of international or-
ganizations, such as the World Bank group in general and IFC
in particular, evidences the World Bank's support for more
general, growth-oriented, structural reforms conducive,
among other things, to the success of the debt-equity conver-
sion framework. IFC has participated in the design and struc-
turing of four investment funds (in Brazil, Chile, Argentina,
and the Philippines).
Third, incentives for banks engaging in a pooled transac-
tion include the management of debt-equity investments
(whether venture capital in nature or stock market funds as in
Chile) by an active professional institution specializing in the
venture-capital business. Such institutions, assuming a high
quality of management, not only have a greater familiarity with
the local investment environment and regulatory framework,
but also can offer priority access to conversion as well as other
operational "sweeteners." In some countries, such as Chile,
the pooled institution offers direct investment in the secondary
market.
2. Disadvantages and Problems to Overcome
The array of complexities associated with the establish-
ment of investment funds is an initial obstacle for the country-
fund mechanism. Because they necessarily involve a number
of diverse participants and are subject to dynamic in-country
environments in which intricate legal, regulatory, administra-
tive, and fiscal frameworks are changing rapidly, investment
funds must, at times, successfully, negotiate a difficult obstacle
course of potential problems.
The quality of fund management is, of course, essential to
the success of the endeavor. Equity investments, by their na-
ture, present more risk than debt, because they are subject to a
wider range of economic and political uncertainties. Because
of these uncertainties, the prospect of sound and active fund
management is necessary to induce holders of debt paper, or
"first-tier" creditors, to convert their position to "second-
developing countries, with a total market capitalization of US$180 billion (up from
US$55 billion six years.ago). In 1987, eleven emerging markets outperformed the
New York Stock Exchange (measured in dollar terms). See, The Emerging Capital Mar-
kets, Swaps: Newsl. New Fin. Instruments, Feb. 1988, at 1, 4.
9 INVESTMENT FUNDS
tier," or equity investment, risk. For this reason, many existing
country-fund structures have instituted regular meetings and
related reporting mechanisms so that investors can continually
monitor the pulse of their collective investments.
Also, if banks invest directly in developing-country equity,
it is easier to avoid substantial write-downs of the debt. When
debt is contributed to a fund, however, under current regula-
tions an exchange has taken place, and there is substantial
pressure for the banks to write down the debt to its secondary
market value immediately.
There is also the more political issue of substantial
changes in the foreign ownership position in the debtor states,
or what has been referred to as "de-nationalization," brought
about by large investment placements made by the investment
funds. The potential exists that national sensitivities could
arise in the event of large-scale debt-equity conversions admin-
istered by an investment fund. The argument would be that
the national patrimony was being sold to foreigners, and at a
price reflecting continued economic weakness and dependence
on the West. Similarly, sensitivities may arise regarding the
view that conversions are a substitute, rather than a stimulus,
for increased levels of foreign investment. There is also the
issue of national investors who might be concerned that the
most attractive investment opportunities in their country are
being secured by foreign sources at a discount, thus further
handicapping local entrepreneurs.
Finally, in a significant number of debtor countries the
number of attractive investment opportunities is limited. Ow-
ing to the relatively large size of most investment funds, there
may be some doubt as to the investment absorption capacity of
the debtor economy, especially with regard to more promising
investment opportunities.
B. Structural Considerations
A number of considerations-including prevailing tax re-
gimes, the specific domicile of the fund, and the nature of its
investors-determine the optimal structure of such a fund.
Possible structures include (a) a trust, (b) a partnership involv-
ing a general partner and limited partners, and (c) an orthodox
corporate form or a corporation with two tiers, such as a typi-
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cal venture-capital, company in the United States, involving a
management company and an investment company.
1. Trusts
In order to be transparent for U.S. federal income tax pur-
poses, a trust would have to qualify as a "grantor" or "invest-
ment" trust. A grantor trust is essentially a custodial entity in
which the trustee holds a pool of assets for beneficiaries (who
have undivided interests in the pool) but engages in no active
management of the assets. These characteristics appear to be
inconsistent with the plan to convert the initial assets of the
fund (country debt obligations) into equity and to subse-
quently manage the portfolio.
2. Partnerships
A limited partnership could be a vehicle for the fund,
whereby the fund portfolio could be actively managed by the
general partner. However, the principal obstacle to a limited
partnership vehicle would be the requirement that the corpo-
rate general partner be adequately capitalized: namely, that the
net worth of the general partner should be at all times at least
ten percent of the total contributions to the partnership, ex-
cluding the net worth calculation of the corporate general
partner's interest in the partnership. 8
3. Corporations
The third alternative would be to organize an investment
company in the United States. In order to be transparent for
U.S. federal income tax purposes, the entity would have to
qualify as a Regulated Investment Company ("RIC") under the
tax code. 59 To qualify as a RIC, the fund would have to be
registered with the Securities and Exchange Commission (the
"SEC") as an investment company and would have to meet
three qualifications regarding its income and assets. First, in
regard to the "passive" character of its income, the fund is lim-
ited by section 851 (b) (2) of the Internal Revenue Code, which
stipulates the following:
58. See Rev. Proc. 72-13.02, 1972-1 C.B. 735.
59. I.R.C. § 851 (1982 & Supp. IV 1986).
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[A]t least 90 percent of its gross income is derived from div-
idends, interest, payments with respect to securities loans
(as defined in section 512(a)(5)), and gains from the sale or
other disposition of stock or securities (as defined in section
2(a)(36) of the Investment Company Act of 1940, as amended) or
foreign currencies, or other income (including but not limited to gains
from options, futures, or forward contracts) derived with respect to its
business of investing in such stock, securities, or currencies.6 0
The second qualification is that less than thirty percent of
its gross income be derived from the sale of securities held for
less than three months. 6  Finally, the investment company
must meet a set of asset-diversification requirements: the per-
tinent troublesome diversification limitations, applicable "at
the close of each quarter of the taxable year," are (1) the re-
quirement that at least fifty percent of the value of total assets
is represented by cash and cash items (including receivables),
plus other securities for purposes of this calculation limited in
respect to any one issuer to an amount not greater than five
percent of the value of total assets62 and (2) the requirement
that not more than twenty-five percent of the value of its total
assets is invested in the securities of any one issuer.63
The qualifications relating to "passive" character and the
limits on gross income derived from sale of securities held for
less than three months should not be obstacles to the proposal.
However, at least during the initial period of operation of the
fund, it may be difficult to satisfy the diversification require-
ments applicable to RICs. For the first year or two of its opera-
tion, the fund's assets would consist predominantly of govern-
mental debt obligations, so it would not be diversified.
One approach that appears to be most efficient in this con-
text is the initial organization and operation of the fund as an
entity outside the United States in a jurisdiction that imposes
only minor, if any, taxes on corporations such as the fund.
Although this approach would not achieve tax transparency,
the impact of tax at the entity level would be avoided. It may
be possible, once a fund's portfolio has been converted out of
60. I.R.C. § 851(b)(2). The emphasized portions represent additions made by
§ 653(b) of the Tax Reform Act of 1986, Pub. L. No. 99-514, 100 Stat. 2298.
61. I.R.C. § 851(b)(3).
62. I.R.C., § 851(b)(4)(A).
63. I.R.C. § 851(b)(4)(B).
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governmental debt obligations, to "convert" the fund to the
status of an entity organized in the United States, registered
with the SEC as an investment company, and qualifying as a
RIC for U.S. tax purposes.64
In addition to considerations pertaining to the form of the
fund, there are a number of salient factors relevant to the se-
lection of a non-U.S. domicile. The most important character-
istic of an appropriate domicile for a fund is a low-tax jurisdic-
tion that would impose no substantial corporate tax on income
received by the fund or withholding tax on distributions made
by the fund. Similarly, the most appropriate jurisdiction would
not have substantial franchise or capital gains taxes on fund
shares. To this end, it would be helpful if the jurisdiction had
tax treaties with the United States, the United Kingdom,Japan,
and other jurisdictions in which putative participating banks
are situated. The existence of exchange controls should also
be considered when selecting a domicile for the fund.
C. Role of Developmental Finance Institutions
In addition to the activities of IFC that have been de-
scribed above, the Overseas Private Investment Corporation
("OPIC") and the recently established Multilateral Investment
Guarantee Agency ("MIGA") of the World Bank group may
insure certain investment funds and may serve as an incentive
to attract additional participants to debt-equity conversions
and investment funds. By guaranteeing or insuring the equity
investments being made by U.S. and other investors in devel-
oping countries through the debt-equity conversion process,
these institutions encourage greater use of this vehicle and
help, albeit modestly, in softening the sharper edges of the
debt crisis. OPIC is limited to insuring investments by U.S.
persons (including corporations), while MIGA, which recently
began full-time operations, may guarantee investments made
by entities from member countries, including the United
States.65
64. This is an ideal scenario, but may not be applicable under the legal
frameworks of certain debtor countries. Chile, for example, requires that the funds
remain in Chilean companies for ten years. See Garc~s, Foreign Debt Conversion in Chile,
in GUIDE, supra note 12, at 24, 28-29.
65. For an analysis of MIGA's proposed membership and operations, see
Shihata, The Multilateral Investment Guarantee Agency, 20 INT'L LAw. 485, 488-89 (1986);
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D. Examples of Investment Funds
1. Brazil
In Brazil, a new debt-equity investment fund has recently
been organized. The fund is known as Equitypar and is organ-
ized as a corporation under Brazilian law.
Equitypar has been capitalized through debt-equity con-
versions in the amount of approximately US$85 million from
foreign sources. Because the application to the Brazilian Cen-
tral Bank for approval of Equitypar was made prior to July 20,
1987, investors in the company choosing the debt conversion
process will benefit from the general rules in effect at that time,
including Central Bank Carta Circular No. 1125.66 These rules
require receipt of one hundred cents in local currency for each
dollar converted, full registration of converted amounts' of for-
eign capital for purposes of dividends, and capital repatriation
on a one-to-one basis. This fund is for venture capital invest-
ments in Brazil.
Other rules for dividend and capital repatriation are
(a) remittance of dividends as of year one in line with standard
dividend repatriation rules applicable to foreign investments
and (b) investors must agree to maintain their capital invest-
ment in Brazil for a period of twelve years.
Another such fund, called the Brazil Conversion Fund, has
also recently been organized by Morgan Grenfell & Co., in a
maximum amount of US$100 million. Investors in this fund
may sell their holdings after twelve years and can repatriate
dividends throughout the life of their investment in the fund.67
2. Philippines
In the Philippines, Shearson Lehman Hutton and IFC
have launched a new equity investment fund called First Philip-
Harris, World Bank Unveils Investment Risk Plan, Fin. Times, Apr. 13, 1988, at 4, col. 3;
Lawrence, US Joins Agency on LDC Investment, J. Com., Apr. 13, 1988, at 7A, col. 4;
Bovard, MIGA Could Help to Insure Expropriation, Wall St. J., Dec. 22, 1987, at 18, col.
3. With regard to OPIC, one of the best treatments is Gilbert & Marra, Overseas Pri-
vate Investment Corporation, in INTERNATIONAL FINANCIAL LAw: LENDING, CAPITAL
TRANSFERS AND INSTITUTIONS 215 (R. Rendell ed. 1980).
66. See supra note 33.
67. See Morgan Grenfell Sets Up Brazilian Debt-Swap Fund, Wall St. J., Feb. 2, 1988,
at 33, col. 4.
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pine Capital Fund L.P. (the "Fund").6" The initial capital of
the Fund amounted to approximately US$65 million.69
The Fund has been organized as a limited partnership
under the laws of Delaware and will be managed by a subsidi-
ary of a U.S. investment banking firm. Initial capital for the
Fund has been provided by IFC in the form of cash and by
other investors in the form of sovereign debt owed them by the
Philippine public sector.70
The Fund is intended to assist the Philippine govern-
ment's debt-equity conversion program by funneling private
investment into a broader range of industries than would
otherwise have been likely. The Fund itself will invest in a
wide range of types of equity and quasi-equity securities of
Philippine corporations including common and preferred
stock, debentures convertible into common and preferred
stock, and shares or debentures having warrants or rights to
purchase common or preferred stock attached.
Such investments are expected to include new issues of
equity securities of Philippine corporations resulting from
privatizations, restructurings, and recapitalizations; new joint-
venture companies being established in promising sectors of
the economy (particularly the export sector); and new issues of
common or preferred stock of existing Philippine companies,
including some listed on local stock exchanges. The Fund's
ability to invest will be subject to the limitations of the conver-
sion program and the Philippine government's foreign invest-
ment regulations, as well as to prudential limits on the types
and amounts of individual investments. It is anticipated that
the Fund's assets may not be fully invested in equities until ap-
proximately three years after establishment of the Fund.
Profits of the Fund will be allocated and distributed to the
partners semi-annually, in U.S. dollars, on the following basis:
(1) ninety-nine percent to the limited partners and one percent
to the general partner, until such time as each limited partner
has received the sum of the face value of his capital contribu-
tion plus an annual return defined as (a) six-month London
68. Fidler, Shearson in Philippine Equity Fund Venture, Fin. Times, June 17, 1988, at
28, col. 5.
69. Id.
70. Id.
INVESTMENT FUNDS
Interbank Offered Rate ("LIBOR") as computed successively
over the period since the partnership's commencement, plus
(b) three percent; (2) subsequently, one-hundred percent to
the general partner until its capital account equals twenty-five
percent of the partnership's total capital accounts; (3) thereaf-
ter, twenty-five percent to the general partner and seventy-five
percent to the limited partners.
As an additional attraction for U.S. investors, the partner-
ship interests of eligible investors will be guaranteed against
certain political risks by OPIC. Interests in the Fund will be
transferable only with the express consent of the general part-
ner and a written opinion of counsel that the transfer would
not result in the Fund having to register under the U.S. Invest-
ment Company Act of 1940.71
3. Chile
In Chile, the new debt-equity conversion investment fund
is known as The Chile Investment Company S.A. (the "Com-
pany"),72 a private limited liability company (sociedad anonima
cerrada) sponsored by IFC and Midland Bank PLC. The Com-
pany was formed under the laws of Chile for a term of twelve
years, with the purpose of providing eligible non-Chilean enti-
ties with an opportunity to participate in investments in Chil-
ean securities by converting certain debts of the Chilean Cen-
tral Bank into an equivalent amount of bearer notes, which are
in turn used to subscribe to shares of the Company.7 3
In this case, the Company had an initial capitalization of
US$30 million. Funds of the Company will ultimately be used
to purchase shares of Chilean companies, with the following
restrictions, among others: (a) the Company may not purchase
a security if as a result (i) more than ten percent of the Com-
pany's total assets would then be invested in securities issued
or guaranteed by a single issuer or (ii) more than twenty-five
percent of the Company's total assets would be invested in a
single industry; and, (b) the Company may not purchase any
security if as a result the Company would then hold more than
71. 15 U.S.C. §§ 80a-1 to -64 (1982 & Supp. IV 1986).
72. Morgan, Midland/IFC Debt Scheme Seen as a First for Chile, Reuters, Oct. 9,
1987 (LEXIS, Nexis library, Omni file).
73. Duffy, Plan Launched by Midland Bank Swaps Chilean Debt for Equity, Am.
Banker, Oct. 13, 1987, at 2, col. 1.
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fifteen percent of any class of securities of an issuer. 4
CONCLUSION
A. Current Impact of Investment Funds on International Debt-
Equity Swaps
In the context of the substantial levels of sovereign debt
carried by the Latin American countries, the emergence of
debt-equity conversions must be viewed as a stop-gap measure
and not a substitute for the more fundamental international
response necessary to eliminate the current debt crisis. The
volume of the debt and the complexity of the debt-equity con-
version transactions make that result impractical.
In early 1987, Richard S. Weinert, a New York investment
banker active in debt-equity swaps, noted that
[t]otal foreign investment in Mexico, for example, is esti-
mated at only $15 billion, compared with a total debt of
some $100 billion. Even if capitalization schemes were to
restore the investment flow to earlier levels, these would
amount to only a small fraction of the debt service.
7 5
This observation is applicable to the Latin American re-
gion as a whole, which at the end of 1985 was estimated to
have an aggregate debt level of some US$368 billion and a cor-
responding foreign investment level of only US$60 billion.76
The addition of the investment fund feature to this debt
conversion framework is likely to magnify its impact and, in a
sense, to "wholesale" the idea of debt-equity swaps by turning
swaps into'a commodity that is available to a broader range of
investors, with fewer complications and on a more cost effec-
tive basis.
B. Prospects for the Future
Although novel and innovative, debt-equity swaps contain
a number of troubling and complicated aspects, not the least of
which is the sheer amount of time and effort needed to com-
plete a transformation, of government debt to private equity
74. Mark, Foreigners Find Favour and Incentives, EUROMONEY, Jan. 1988, at 64, 68
(Supp. on Global Debt).
75. Weinert, supra note 23, at 93.
76. Rodriguez, supra note 13, at 14.
INVESTMENT FUNDS
investment. This is compounded when systemic changes are
contemplated or implemented by a developing country.
Another troubling feature is that there is a limited supply
of equity in good companies in these countries that can be
swapped effectively. In many of the countries with the largest
external debt, the availability of enterprises that can be made
profitable, and thus be of interest to developed-country inves-
tors or creditors, has already begun to run low. The compara-
tive volume of the debt in these countries limits the possible
impact of swaps and investment funds.
An additional problem arising with regard to swaps in par-
ticular has to do with the possible inflationary impact of pro-
moting such swaps. In Mexico, where the debt-equity swap
program was recently suspended, there has been a distinct in-
flationary impact on the local economy resulting from the need
to print additional pesos to cover converted loans.
Despite these qualms, the advantages inherent in policies
promoting swaps and investment funds in most instances ap-
pear to outweigh the risks. Debt swaps, along with investment
funds, seem to be among the few vehicles that a government
can use to revitalize a stagnant economy, to reduce outstand-
ing debt, and to encourage a fresh inflow of capital. Given the
lack of other viable policy alternatives, these new techniques
should be pushed as far as their intrinsic merits can take them.
The U.S. Treasury, the International Monetary Fund, the
World Bank group (in particular, International Finance Corpo-
ration) and a significant number of developing countries ap-
pear quite enthusiastic about the combination of investment
funds and debt-equity swaps. Draft legislation may come
before the U.S. House Banking Committee that would estab-
lish a new multilateral agency, backed by the IMF and/or the
World Bank, which would buy developing-country debt at a
discount and resell it. 77
Proponents of Latin American debt capitalization transac-
tions anticipate that through this mechanism, developing
countries will be able to provide incentives for hundreds of
millions of dollars of new investment within the next few years.
If investments through debt-equity swaps and investment
77. See, e.g., Rowen, Fresh Ideas for Debt Crisis, Wash. Post, June 7, 1987, at HI,
col. 1.
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funds are sufficiently encouraged by regulators here and
abroad, and if those investments are properly directed, such
transactions may provide a constructive mechanism for the re-
duction of foreign debt, the recovery of many developing
country economies, and a lucrative market for third-party in-
vestors. Debt-equity conversion funds are an interesting new
tool that could accelerate this process and bring in new players
who might not otherwise have participated in the process, such
as regional U.S. banks with relatively small exposures in debt
or country terms.
Even though they have been of comparatively modest im-
pact in total dollar terms, debt-equity swaps and investment
funds can serve as important escape valves for underlying fi-
nancial pressures. These new tools show that while the inter-
national debt crisis may be ongoing, it need not be never-end-
ing.
